Estimating the returns to schooling : a likelihood approach based on normal mixtures by Dagsvik, John K. et al.
Discussion Papers No. 567, December 2008 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
John K. Dagsvik, Torbjørn Hægeland and 
Arvid Raknerud 
Estimating the Returns to 
Schooling: A Likelihood 
Approach Based on Normal 
Mixtures  
Abstract: 
In this paper we develop likelihood based methods for statistical inference in a joint system of 
equations for the choice of length of schooling and earnings. The model for schooling choice is 
assumed to be an ordered probit model, whereas the earnings equation contains variables that are 
flexible transformations of schooling and experience, with corresponding coefficients that are allowed 
to be heterogeneous across individuals. Under the assumption that the distribution of the random 
terms of the model can be expressed as a particular finite mixture of multinormal distributions, we 
show that the joint probability distribution for schooling and earnings can be expressed on closed 
form. In an application of our method on Norwegian data, we find that the mixed Gaussian model 
offers a substantial improvement in fit to the (heavy-tailed) empirical distribution of log-earnings 
compared to a multinormal benchmark model. 
Keywords: Schooling choice, earnings equation, normal mixtures, treatment effects, self-selection, 
random coefficients, full information maximum likelihood 
JEL classification: C31, I20, J30 
Acknowledgement: Financial support from The Norwegian Research Council ("KUNI") is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
Address:  John K. Dagsvik, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: jda@ssb.no.  
Torbjørn Hægeland, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: thd@ssb.no.  
Arvid Raknerud, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: rak@ssb.no 
 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers  
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
NO-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
1 Introduction
The relationship between schooling and earnings is one of the most frequently stud-
ied in empirical economics. A large number of these studies build upon versions of
the earnings equation proposed by Mincer (1974). A key parameter in the Mincer
earnings equation is the coe¢ cient associated with years of schooling, intended to
capture the e¤ect on earnings di¤erences caused by di¤erences in schooling. How-
ever, to give a causal interpretation of the parameters in the earnings equation, one
must take into account that the independent variable years of schooling is en-
dogenous because it is the outcome of a choice variable. The endogeneity problem
is related to the fact that the econometrician does not observe all factors that a¤ect
schooling choice. If some of these unobserved factors are correlated with unobserv-
ables in the earnings equation, OLS will produce biased estimates of the returns to
schooling (ability bias).
Traditionally, ability bias is assumed to arise because of correlation between
length of schooling and the additive error term in the earnings equation. If such
correlation exists and is positive, it implies that people with high earnings capacity
(irrespective of level of schooling) systematically choose a higher schooling level
than people with low earnings capacity. In the literature, such heterogeneity is often
termed absolute advantage. Various econometric methods have been developed to
deal with this problem, see Griliches (1977) for an overview of the early literature.
Several more recent econometric studies have also taken into account that there
may be heterogeneity not only associated with general earning capacity, but also
associated with returns to schooling: Some individuals gain more from an extra
year of schooling than others, cf. for example the theoretical model of Willis and
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Rosen (1979). Heterogeneity of this sort is often termed comparative advantage,
and is typically dealt with by formulating a random coe¢ cient model, in which the
coe¢ cient associated with years of schooling is allowed to vary across individuals
according to some distribution function. If this random coe¢ cient is correlated
with the schooling variable or the additive error term in the earnings equation, then
standard OLS estimates of returns to schooling will be biased.
To deal with ability bias and endogeneity of schooling, instrumental variable
approaches have often been applied. As a result, there is now a substantial literature
on how to interpret instrumental variable estimates in the case of heterogeneity in
returns to schooling. See for example Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), Wooldridge
(2002) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). A somewhat closely related approach is
the so-called two-stage- or control function approach. In this approach a choice-of-
schooling equation is estimated in the rst stage from which suitable variables are
computed. In a second stage, these variables are used as additional regressors in
the earnings equation, to account for the correlations between the schooling variable
and the error terms, see Heckman (1979) and Garen (1984). Card (2001) gives
an overview of these approaches to estimating earnings relations in the presence of
individual heterogeneity in the returns to schooling.
In addition to the focus on di¤erent types of selection biases there has been
a growing attention to the specication of the Mincer equation in the literature.
One of the most important features of the Mincer equation is that log earnings is
assumed to be linear in years of schooling, while another is the assumed separability
between schooling and experience. Several papers, e.g. Heckman and Polachek
(1974), Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) and Belzil (2007) have examined the
validity of  and the consequences of relaxing  these and other functional form
assumptions of the standard Mincer framework. A general nding is that some of the
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simplifying assumptions are rejected, and hence that there is need for a framework
that accommodates more exibility.
Several authors have incorporated a structural, discrete choice dynamic program-
ming approach to model schooling and related labor market decisions. Keane and
Wolpin (1997) estimate a dynamic human capital investment model of schooling-,
employment- and occupation-decisions, where skill heterogeneity and hence self-
selection plays a role in all three choices. Belzil and Hansen (2002a) estimate a
dynamic programming model where individuals di¤er in market and schooling abil-
ity, and relax the assumption of constant marginal returns to schooling. They nd
clear evidence of ability bias, and, perhaps more importantly, that the (log) wage-
schooling relationship is highly non-linear, so that ...estimation methods that do
not allow for a exible estimation of the local returns to schooling will lead to un-
reliable estimates of both the local and the average return to schooling.Belzil and
Hansen (2007) estimate a model with both absolute and comparative advantage (a
correlated random coe¢ cient wage regression model) within a dynamic program-
ming framework. Belzil (2007) provides a thorough review of structural approaches
to estimating the returns to schooling. He also compares this approach to the in-
strumental variables approach, and discusses commonalities and di¤erences. On this
latter point, see also Keane (2005).
The approach developed in this paper is, from the perspective of structural choice
modelling, more modest than the dynamic programming setting. Specically, in
line with other works dating back to Cameron and Heckman (1998), we represent
schooling choice by a simple stochastic index function that yields an ordered probit
model. The idea of approximating individual schooling choices by a semi-structural
model dates back to Cameron and Heckman (1998). The ordered model accounts
for forward-looking behavior and unobserved heterogeneity. However, by essentially
5
modelling schooling choice as a static decision, an implicit assumption is that all
future uncertainty is observed initially. Since the focus of our analysis is on the
associated earnings relation, a structural dynamic schooling choice model does not
seem necessary. In contrast, if the purpose is to analyze schooling choices per se,
then a structural dynamic choice model is of interest.
In our study the earnings relation is rather general and exible, both with respect
to assumptions about the distribution of unobserved variables, functional forms, and
the correlation structure of the random coe¢ cients. As a result, we are able to allow
for two types of self-selection into schooling; namely selection by absolute advan-
tage (correlation between schooling and the additive error term in the earnings
equation) and selection by comparative advantage(correlation between schooling
and the random coe¢ cients associated with the returns to schooling and experience).
Our approach o¤ers several advantages over the traditional two-stage, control
function approach. First, since estimation is carried out in one stage, we do not
have to worry about biased estimates of the standard errors. Such biases may arise
because of imputation of parameters estimated in the rst-stage and because, con-
ditional on the individuals choice, the error term is heteroscedastic. Second, our
approach allows us to deal with non-linear transformations of earnings, schooling
and experience that may contain unknown parameters (such as in Box-Cox trans-
formations), as well as random components that can be represented as mixtures of
normally distributed random variables. Third, our approach makes it easy to test
interesting hypotheses by means of the likelihood ratio test, whereas in the two-stage
method exact testing will be cumbersome.
Our framework has many similarities with Carneiro et al. (2003), who consider a
setting with one probit model for the schooling choice and several measurement equa-
tions, with mixed multinormally distributed random components. Their estimation
6
strategy is based on a particular Bayesian approach which requires Markov Chain
Monte Carlo methods. In contrast, we show that when the random components
are mixed multinormally distributed one can express the corresponding likelihood
function on closed form and derive explicit formulas for several types of treatment
e¤ects.
A key issue in the recent literature on returns to schooling (and more generally
in the program evaluation literature), is the discussion of how key structural para-
meters associated with the returns to schooling can be identied. The strategy in
the IV/experimentalist literature is to search for valid exclusion restrictions, where
the excluded variables are the source of exogenous variation in the level of schooling.
On the other hand, the structural literature relies more explicitly on parametric as-
sumptions (identication by functional form). We emphasize that also within our
framework interpretation of the results depends on exclusion restrictions, although
such restrictions are not formally needed to obtain identication.
In an application of our method on Norwegian data, it is conrmed that selection
e¤ects due to unobservables are important when analyzing the returns to schooling.
Specically, we nd a signicant positive correlation between the error term of the
schooling choice equation and the random coe¢ cient of schooling in the earnings
equation, and a signicant negative correlation between the additive error term of
the schooling choice equation and the additive error term of the earnings equa-
tion. Moreover, our study shows, similar to Heckman and Polachek (1974), that,
for all practical purposes, the specication with logarithm of earnings ts the data
best (within the class of Box-Cox transformations). Regarding the transformation
of the independent variables, we nd that piecewise linear functions of length of
schoolingand of experiencegive better t and also substantially di¤erent results
than generalized Box-Cox transformations (Box-Cox transformations with arbitrary
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translations). While allowance for mixed normally distributed error terms is essen-
tial for obtaining a good t to the empirical distributions of log earnings (given
di¤erent levels of schooling), many of our results are quite robust with respect to
the specication of the error distribution, including the estimated marginal returns
to schooling as a function of years of schooling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the modeling
framework and derive several results that enable us to carry out empirical inferences.
In Section 3 we present the empirical application, while Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 The modelling framework
In this section we specify the modelling framework for estimating the earnings equa-
tion and the choice of schooling relation. We rst present a benchmark model with
normally distributed error terms. We then extend this model to incorporate mix-
tures of normal distributions.
2.1 The basic model
We follow Cameron and Heckman (1998) in assuming a semi-structural probit model
for the choice of length of schooling. From a choice theoretic perspective this model
may be viewed a reduced form one, but it is semi-structural in the sense that it
accounts for the hierarchical and discrete nature of the choice setting, in the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences1.
1The choice model only considers length of schooling and is silent about other potential impor-
tant dimensions of the choice setting, such as type of schooling and occupational choice. Techni-
cally, this means that when we condition on length of schooling, type of schooling and occupation
is exogeneous. This means that we implicitly make the (rather strong) assumption that, given the
length of schooling, there is no self-selection into elds of study. While relaxing this assumption is
outside the scope of the present paper, this is certainly an interesting topic for future research.
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Let X be a latent index that represents the desired level of schooling on a
continuous scale. The observed level of education, J , is a categorical variable with
M possible categories; J 2 f1; 2; ::;Mg. It is related to X through the relation
J = j i¤ j 1 < X
 < j , j = 1; :::;M , (1)
where fjg are unknown threshold values, except for 0 =  1 and M = 1.
The variable J represents the choice of level of schooling as constrained by the
institutional schooling system, whereas X represents the individuals preferences
with regard to the level of schooling on a continuous scale. The threshold values
fjg determine the level of schooling in the institutional schooling system that
corresponds to X.
Furthermore, we assume that
X = Z11 + "1; (2)
where Z1 is a row-vector of exogenous variables a¤ecting the individuals choice of
schooling (typically family background variables describing the situation prior to
the choice of schooling), "1 is a normally distributed random variable with zero
mean and unit variance and 1 is a xed, unknown coe¢ cient vector. Thus, (1)-(2)
species a standard ordered probit model for the discrete choice variable J .
Consider now the earnings equation. Let T1(X1;1) be a transformation of years
of schooling, X1; and T2(X2;2) a transformation of labor market experience, X2.
By experience we mean age minus years of schooling minus seven years, i.e., potential
experience. Each of the transformations T1(X1;1) and T2(X2;2) may be a Box-
Cox, polynomial, or spline function and possibly depend on unknown parameter
vectors, 1 and 2, respectively. Our earnings equation is given by
(Y    1)= = T (X;)( + ) + Z22 + "2, (3)
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where  is an unknown parameter to be estimated, X = (X1; X2) and T (X;) =
(T1(X1;1); T2(X2;2)). Moreover,  = (1; 2)
0 is a zero mean random coe¢ cient
vector,  = (1; 2)
0 is the corresponding xed coe¢ cient vector, Z2 is a vector of
exogenous variables which in addition to the components of Z1 also may contain
other variables a¤ecting earnings, 2 is a vector of corresponding coe¢ cients, and
"2 is a zero mean random term.
Note that, with the usual convention that (Y    1)= = lnY when  = 0, the
dependent variable in (3) is a continuously di¤erentiable transformation of Y . Also
note that, through the random coe¢ cient vector , our model allows for hetero-
geneity in the coe¢ cients of both schooling and experience. The vector of random
terms ("1; "2; 0) is assumed to be multinormally distributed with zero mean and a
general covariance matrix, apart from the conventional identifying restriction that
"1 has unit variance. Even in the special case where the parameters  and  are
known (or given), one cannot estimate (3) by standard methods due to the fact that
T (X;) depends on "1, which may be correlated with both  and "2.2
Let (X1) be the function that assigns the schooling level that corresponds to
X1 years of schooling, i.e., J = (X1). If () is one-to-one, then X1 =  1(J) and
X2 =age X1 7 (in this case () is, in fact, redundant). However, it may be useful
to have a framework which allows a given level of schooling to cover several possible
values for X1. For example, one may want to assume (after initial exploration)
that the self-selection is related to broader educational levels, such as short and long
tertiary education, rather than actual years of schooling within these levels. For some
specic years of schooling there may also be few observations. In our application in
2In the specication of the earnings relation given in (3), we have assumed separability between
length of schooling and experience. Several papers, see, e.g., Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2008),
have shown that this assumption may be unrealstic. In principle, it is possible also within our
framework to incorporate transformations with interactions. However, since such an extension
raises many new questions; e.g. with respect to functional form assumptions, how to incorporate
heterogeneity in the interaction e¤ects and interpretation of the results, we have decided to leave
this problem aside for future research.
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Section 3, the highest category of schooling (j = 8) covers the interval from 16 to
18 years of schooling. In that case, () is not one-to-one. However, the actual
realization of X1 within the interval is assumed to be exogenous in the sense that
the distribution of X1 conditional on J is independent of the random terms "1; "2
and . Thus, in our application we ignore any selectivity issues related to the choice
between, say, 16 and 17 years of schooling.
To denote the outcome of X given a particular level of schooling J = j, we use
the notation Xj. Thus Xj may denote any value of X that is consistent with the
choice J = j. Whereas X is an endogenous variable, Xj is exogenous. For example,
given that J = j, Xj2 depends on age, which is exogenous.
Let Z denote the vector of all relevant exogenous variable of the model (including
age and the variables in Z1 and Z2) and let
E("1"2) = , E("1k) = k; k = 1; 2, (4)
and  = (1; 2)
0. Then, we can write
"2 = "1 + e"2,  = "1 + e, (5)
where e"2 and e are independent of "1, with mean zero and a general covariance
matrix, . Let () denote the standard normal c.d.f. and () the corresponding
density. We have the following result:
Theorem 1 Assume that ("1; "2; 0) is multinormally distributed with zero mean
and let  be the covariance matrix of (e"2;e0),
g(T (Xj;))2 =
h 
1; T (Xj;)


 
1; T (Xj;)
0i
(6)
and
 (T (Xj;))2 = g(T (Xj;))2 + (T (Xj;)+ )2: (7)
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If f(y; jjZ) denotes the joint density of (Y; J) given Z; then
f(y; jjZ) =
y 1
 (T (Xj;))


(y   1)=   T (Xj;)   Z22
 (T (Xj;))





j   Z11  
((y   1)=   T (Xj;)   Z22) (T (Xj;)+ )
 (T (Xj;))2

 (T (Xj;))
g(T (Xj;))

 

j 1   Z11  
((y   1)=   T (Xj;)   Z22) (T (Xj;)+ )
 (T (Xj;))2

 (T (Xj;))
g(T (Xj;))

:
(8)
The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows that the joint density of (Y; J) (conditional on Z) can be
expressed on closed form by means of the normal c.d.f. and p.d.f. The rst factor
in (8) can be interpreted as the marginal distribution of Y when level of schooling
is considered a xed index (j) that is, not as the outcome of the choice variable
J . The second factor expresses the conditional distribution of J given Y .
The fact that one can express f(y; jjZ) on closed form has several important
advantages. First, it becomes easy to carry out maximum likelihood estimation and
to perform statistical tests by means of the likelihood ratio statistic. Second, as we
show in Corollary 2 below, it is easy to extend the model to the case where the
distribution of the random components ("1; "2; 0) can be expressed as a particular
nite mixture of multinormal distributions. Third, by utilizing the results in Corol-
lary 3 below, several types of treatment e¤ects commonly discussed in the literature,
can be estimated.
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2.2 Extension to normal mixtures
Similarly to Carneiro et al. (2003) we now consider the case where the distribution
of the error term in the earnings equation is a nite mixture of normal distributions.
Moreover, this distribution is allowed to depend on the chosen level of schooling, J .
These extensions are highly relevant from an applied point of view. First, earnings
data typically have heavy tails and may be skewed (also after applying appropriate
transformations). Second, the shape of the earnings distribution may vary across
di¤erent levels of schooling. Specically, we assume in this section that the vec-
tor of error terms ("1; "2; 0) in the model analyzed in section 2.1 is replaced by
("1(R); "
J
2 (R); (R)
0), with
"J2 (R) = JR"2(R) + JR, (9)
where, for xed j and r, jr and jr are unknown scale and location parameters, re-
spectively, and ("1(r); "2(r); (r)0) is an i.i.d. vector with the same (standardized)
mean-zero multivariate normal distribution as ("1; "2; 0) (specied in Section 2.1).
Equations (2) and (3) in Section 2.1. are then replaced, respectively, by
X = Z11 + "1(R) (10)
and
(Y    1)= = T (X;)( + (R)) + Z22 + "J2 (R). (11)
The above specication means that "J2 (R) is mixed Gaussian, whereas ("1(R); (R)
0)
is multinormally distributed.3
Now let f(y; jjZ;R = r) denote the joint density of earnings and chosen schooling
level (Y; J), given Z and R = r. We then have the following result:
3Tecnically it is possible to allow both "1(R) and (R) to be mixed Gaussian (similarly to
"J2 (R)). But this extension is hardly interesting from an empirical point of view, as the data reveal
little (if anything) about the shapes of the distributions of these variables.
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Corollary 2 Let ("1(r); "2(r); (r)0), r = 1; 2; : : : ; Q, be i.i.d. multinormal random
vectors with the same distribution as ("1; "2,0) for every r. Let R be a multinomi-
ally distributed random variable, independent of ("1(r); "2(r); (r)0) for each r, with
P (R = r) = qr. Assume that in the model in Section 2.1, (2) and (3) are replaced
by (10) and (11), respectively, where "J2 (R) is given by (9). Then
f(y; jjZ;R = r) =
y 1
 jr(T (X
j;))


(y   1)=   T (Xj;)   Z22   jr
 jr(T (X
j;))


(

 "
j   Z11  
 
(y   1)=   T (Xj;)   Z22   jr

(T (Xj;)+ )
 2jr(T (X
j;))
#
 jr(T (X
j;))
gjr(T (Xj;))
!
 
 "
j 1   Z11  
 
(y   1)=   T (Xj;)   Z22   jr

(T (Xj;)+ )
 2jr(T (X
j;))
#
 jr(T (X
j;))
gjr(T (Xj;))
!)
;
(12)
where
gjr(T (X
j;))2 =
h 
1; T (Xj;)

jr(r)
 
1; T (Xj;)
0i
(13)
jr(r) = DjrDjr;Djr =
24 jr 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
35 (14)
 jr(T (X
j;))2 = gjr(T (X
j;))2 + (T (Xj;)+ jr)
2: (15)
The proof of the Corollary is given in Appendix A.
Consequently, the joint density of (Y; J) conditional on Z can be expressed as
f(y; jjZ) =
QX
r=1
qrf(y; jjZ;R = r):
We have thus shown that in the special case with only one outcome equation in
addition to the choice equation, the likelihood function can be expressed on closed
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form also in the case when the distribution of the the error term in the earnings
equation is a nite mixture of normal distributions.
Our model can be seen as a (non-Bayesian) version of the model estimated in
Carneiro et al. (2003) (see Section 7 and Appendix B in their paper). They con-
sider (complicated) simulation based Bayesian inference in a model with several
measurement or outcome equations (in addition to the schooling choice equation).
The factor structure and the distributional assumptions they impose on the random
terms, coincide with the distributional assumptions made in this paper when there
is only one measurement equation (i.e., the earnings equation), except that we al-
low more exibility by letting the parameters in the distribution of "j2(r) also to be
specic for each level of schooling, j. This extension raises specic identication
issues.
First, to obtain identication of the intercept in (11), we assume that
QX
r=1
qrjr = 0; for j = 1; :::;M . (16)
Thus, E("j2(R)) = 0 for every level of schooling, j. As a further identifying restriction
we impose
QX
r=1
qrjr = 1; for j = 1; ::;M: (17)
As seen fromCorollary 3 below, (17) has the important implication thatE("k2(R)jJ =
j) is independent of k. Thus, a person who actually chooses J = j, will by assump-
tion have the same expected value of the additive error term "k2(R) at all (other)
levels of schooling, k. The restriction (17) rules out that the idiosyncratic part of
the marginal returns to schooling, which is assumed to be picked up by the random
coe¢ cient (R), may be confounded by a shift in the mean of the additive error
term, leading to obvious problems of identifying and interpreting our model.
15
Corollary 3 Under the assumptions of Corollary 2 and the restrictions in (16);
E((R)jJ = j) =  (j) (18)
and
E("k2(R)jJ = j) =  
 
QX
r=1
qrkr
!
(j) ; j; k = 1; ::;M , (19)
where
(j) =
(j   Z11)  (j 1   Z11)
(j   Z11)  (j 1   Z11)
. (20)
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in Appendix A.
From Corollary 3 and the additional restriction (17), it follows that we can
express (11) as
(Y    1)= = T (X;)   (j)T (X;)+ Z22   (j) + "; j = 1; ::;M , (21)
where
" = "J2 (R) + (j) + T (X;)((R) + (j)),
and the error term, "; has the property that E("jJ = j) = 0. Thus, if  is known,
it is possible to estimate , , 2 and  consistently by a two-stage procedure in
which (j) is obtained in a rst stage probit analysis using data on schooling choices,
whereas the earnings equation is estimated in a second stage by (a possibly non-
linear) least squares with (j) and (j)T (X;) as additional regressors. Note that
the coe¢ cients of these regressors do not depend on the mixing parameters. This is
due to (17). If (17) is not imposed, the coe¢ cient of (j) becomes PQr=1 qrjr and
hence depends on j. Thus (17) ensures that the mixing parameters only a¤ect the
shape of the earnings distribution at di¤erent levels of schooling (variance, skewness,
kurtosis, etc.), but not the causal e¤ects of schooling. Also note that despite the fact
that there are several endogenous unobservables in the earnings equation, i.e., "J2 (R)
and (R), only one control function, (j), is needed to control for selectivity bias.
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2.3 Denition of treatment e¤ects
When analyzing the implications of alternative schooling choices, it is of interest to
calculate causal e¤ects (treatment e¤ects). The rst is the average treatment e¤ect,
ATE(x):
ATE(x) = 1[T1(x;1)  T1(x  1;1)];
where the expression in the squared bracket is the change in the transformation of
schooling, when years of schooling increases from x   1 to x. The second is the
e¤ect of the treatment on the treated, TT (x), given by
TT (x) = (1 + E(1(R)jX1 = x  1)))) [T1(x;1)  T1(x  1;1)]
= (1   1((x  1))) [T1(x;1)  T1(x  1;1)],
cf. (18), which has the interpretation of the marginal return of increasing years of
schooling from x  1 to x for those who did in fact choose X1 = x  1. Note that
E

"
(x)
2 (R)  "(x 1)2 (R)jJ = (x  1)

= 0
due to (17) and Corollary 3, and hence does not enter the expression for TT (x).
The third e¤ect is the observed di¤erentials between levels of schooling, OD(x):
OD(x) = TT (x) + E("
(x)
2 (R)jX1 = x)  E("(x 1)2 (R)jX1 = x  1)
= (1   1((x  1))) [T1(x;1)  T1(x  1;1)]  (((x))  ((x  1))),
cf. (18) and (19). This is the sum of (i) the average treatment e¤ect, (ii) the average
of the idiosyncratic marginal returns to schooling for the individuals with this level
of schooling and (iii) the average idiosyncratic earnings level e¤ect for the same
individuals.
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3 An empirical application on Norwegian data
3.1 Data and transformations
The data for this application are taken from the Norwegian system of register data,
where individual information about essentially all Norwegian residents is gathered
from a number of governmental administrative registers. Our sample is randomly
drawn from the population of native-born males, who were born between 1952 and
1970, and who were living in Norway in both 1970 and 1997. The data contain
information on years of schooling and type of education for each individual. The
earnings equation sample is further restricted to full-time wage-earners, dened as
individuals working 30 hours or more per week, leaving us with 29332 observations.
Labor market experience is represented by potential experience, i.e., age minus years
of schooling minus seven years. The earnings measure used is total annual taxable
labor income. Because the earnings measure reects annual earnings, observations
where employment relationships started or terminated within the actual year were
excluded. Holders of multiple jobs and individuals who have received labor market
compensation or have participated in active labor market programs have been ex-
cluded. Family background information is taken from the National Census of the
Population and Housing in 1970. A full list of variables with key summary statistics
is given in Tables 2-4.
In our application the level of schooling is divided into eight groups, i.e., J 2
f1; 2; ::; 8g. Level 1 covers the interval [7; 9] years of schooling, levels 2 to 7 corre-
spond to 10-15 years, respectively, whereas level 8 covers the interval [16; 18] years.
The rst category represents compulsory level of schooling (which was gradually
increased from seven to nine years from the late 1950s to the early 1970s). The last
category comprises longer tertiary education. We consider four types of transfor-
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mation functions of schooling (k = 1) and experience (k = 2). Assume that x is an
integer and let [j=2] denote the integer value of j=2:
Linear: Tk(x;k) = x
Quadratic: Tk(x;k) = [(x+ k;1)2   1] =2
Generalized Box-Cox: Tk(x;k) = [(x+ k;1)k;2   1] =k;2
Spline: Tk(x;k) =
Pxk
j=1 k;[j=2], k;0 = 1.
(22)
When k = 1, x denotes years of schooling exceeding 7 years (which is the minimum
value of X1 in our data). When k = 2, x denotes potential experience, dened as age
minus years of schooling minus seven years. The spline transformation of x has knots
every even year (2; 4; 6; 8; :::). Thus, because the maximum values of X1 and X2 in
our sample is 18 years of schooling and 29 years of experience, respectively, we are
able to identify ve 1;[j=2]-parameters ([(18  7)=2] = 5) and 14 2;[j=2]-parameters
([29=2] = 14). Note that the linear and quadratic transformations are special cases of
the (generalized) Box-Cox transformation, obtained by setting k;2 = 1 and k;2 = 2,
respectively.
The vector of explanatory variables in the earnings equation, Z2, includes indi-
cators about sector of occupation (public, private services, manufacturing), eld of
education (general, technical, humanistic, teaching, administrative, etc.) and indi-
cators for each of 19 counties where the individual works. The vector of explanatory
variables of the ordered probit model for schooling choice, Z1, contains variables
regarding the family background. These include dummy variables for birth cohort,
indicators of whether the individual as a child lived with both parents or alone
with either mother or father, the labor market status of the parents, indicators of
household income (quintile and both the fathers and mothers education level), and
whether the person had a mother and/or father who was born abroad. In addition,
the schooling choice equation contains indicator variables for the county where the
individual grew up, for example, where the individual lived in 1970. The main exclu-
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sion restriction in this application, which in addition to functional form assumptions
identies the parameters of the model, is that given all the other covariates in the
model, the region where you grew up may a¤ect your choice of schooling, but not
your earnings. It is well documented that educational choices vary considerably
across regions in Norway. This is true also when conditioning on, for example, fam-
ily background variables. This exclusion restriction is in the spirit of Card (1995)
who used college proximity as an instrument, but may be interpreted in a more
general sense as variations in the opportunity cost of education.
3.2 Results with normally distributed error terms
Estimation results for some key combinations of transformations of earnings, school-
ing and experience are displayed in Table 1 in the case with normally distributed
error terms. A full set of results is reported in Tables 2-4. When interpreting the
results in Table 1, it is important to bear in mind that the parameter estimates of
1 and 2 are not comparable across di¤erent models, as they are coe¢ cients of dif-
ferent transformations of schooling and experience. Moreover, whereas the models
reported in the rst three columns of Table 1 have log earnings as the dependent
variable, the last column reports results from a specication with a general Box-Cox
transformation of earnings.
From Table 1, we rst note that the linear-quadratic specication with regard
to schooling and experience, i.e., the traditional Mincer model, gives a substan-
tially lower log-likelihood than the Box-Cox model (Model 2) and  particularly
 the spline models (Models 3-4). On the other hand, when  = 0, the spline
transformations of x1 and x2 give considerably higher likelihood than the Box-Cox
transformations but at the cost of 15 more parameters. Although the model with
spline transformations of x1 and x2 is clearly the most exible with respect to para-
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meterization, it is not a special case of neither the Box-Cox nor the linear-quadratic
specication. On the other hand, the linear-quadratic specication is a special case
of Box-Cox, with three parameters less. Because the maximum likelihood estimates
are b2;1 = 2:49 and b2;2  0, we see that the estimated Box-Cox transformation of
experience amounts to ln(x2 + 2:49):
With regard to the transformation of earnings, the general Box-Cox transforma-
tion leads to an estimate of  equal to -.17, with a standard error of only .003. The
results suggest that  is signicantly di¤erent from zero. However, from the point
of view of economic signicance  =  :17 is so close to zero that the Box-Cox and
logarithmic transformation are equivalent for practical purposes. We illustrate this
point below.
The estimated correlations between the stochastic terms have interesting eco-
nomic interpretations and give information on the nature of self-selection. However,
the pair-wise correlations reported in Table 1 show that many of these are not ro-
bust across di¤erent model specications. For example, we nd strong evidence of
negative correlation between 2 and "2 when  = 0, but not at the maximum like-
lihood estimate  =  :17. However, with regard to the correlations that have the
clearest economic interpretation we get quite striking results. First of all, it is evi-
dent that self-selection does matter. Concentrating henceforth on the results from
the Box-Cox and spline transformations of schooling and experience, which overall
give the best t to the data and the most plausible results, there are signicant
negative correlations between "1 and "2, i.e., the residual terms of the earnings and
schooling equations. We also nd strong positive correlations between 1 and "1.
Using spline transformations of x1 and x2, we obtain correlation coe¢ cients of the
same magnitude as for the Box-Cox transformations, regardless of whether  = 0
or  =  :17. The robust nding that Corr(1; "1) > 0 implies that individuals
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who have a high preference for schooling (conditional on the exogenous variables)
also have high marginal returns to schooling. On the other hand, the nding that
Corr("1; "2) < 0 means that if an individual with a high preference for schooling
takes a short education, his earnings potential is lower than for an individual with
the same education, but with a low preference for schooling. The correlations men-
tioned above have the interpretation of positive selection by comparative advantage
and negative selection by absolute advantage, respectively. These patterns may also
be interpreted as selection by di¤erent type of skills, with a high "2 reecting high
blue-collar skills, and a high "1 reecting high white-collar skills. It should be kept
in mind that the correlations reported in Table 1 depend on the respective speci-
cations and cannot be interpreted independently of the chosen transformations of
length of schooling and experience.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the returns to schooling and experience,
as seen from the estimated standard deviations SD(1) and SD(2) of 1 and 2,
respectively, which are of the same magnitude as the estimated xed coe¢ cients, b1
and b2. To evaluate the importance of individual heterogeneity in the returns to
experience and schooling, it is natural to look at the variation coe¢ cients SD(1)=b1
and SD(2)=b2: These ratios lie between 1/10 and 1 in all the model specications
and are smaller for schooling than for experience. Thus, it seems that relative to the
xed coe¢ cient, 1 and 2, the unobserved heterogeneity in returns to experience is
larger than in returns to schooling. This higher cross section dispersion in returns
to experience is consistent with what is reported in Belzil and Hansen (2002b). As a
further check of the importance of heterogeneity in the coe¢ cients of schooling and
experience, a model with only a xed coe¢ cient vector (i.e., no -vector) has been
estimated. This restriction reduces the number of parameters by nine. However, it
is rmly rejected by a likelihood ratio test.
22
The di¤erences in results across the four model specications are illustrated in
Figures 14, along with the results from a linear-quadratic specication without se-
lection e¤ects (equivalent to OLS estimation of a standard Mincer equation). Figure
1 shows expected log earnings as a function of years of schooling when all the other
variables of the earnings equation are set equal to their sample mean. In particular,
years of experience is xed at 15 years. The intercepts of the di¤erent graphs in the
gure are determined by the (identifying) condition that when all the variables are
at their sample means, expected log earnings should be equal in all the four model
specications. We see that the two versions of the model with spline transformations
of schooling depicted in Figure 1, i.e., with  = 0 and  =  :17 as the dependent
variables, are almost identical, except for small discrepancies at low values of years
of schooling.
In analyses of returns to schooling and experience, the marginal returns to school-
ing and the earnings-experience proles are of key interest. In models allowing for
heterogeneity in returns, there are several possible marginal returnsor treatment
e¤ectsthat may be calculated, based on the estimation results. Which e¤ects that
are most relevant, depend on the purpose of the analysis. In models with no het-
erogeneity in the returns, all treatment e¤ects coincide.
Figure 2 shows the expected marginal returns to schooling corresponding to the
three specications depicted in Figure 1 that have lnY as the dependent variable.
The natural interpretation of the estimates from the models with selection e¤ects is
as the average treatment e¤ectof schooling (ATE). This means that the graphs
show the marginal e¤ect on earnings of the last year of schooling, for a randomly
selected individual whose years of schooling is shown on the horizontal axis. In
contrast, the interpretation of the OLS estimate shows the (conditional) earnings
di¤erentials between individuals with di¤erent levels of schooling. In the absence of
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selection e¤ects, OLS and the linear specication will coincide.
Comparing OLS with full information maximum likelihood estimation of the lin-
ear specication, we see from Figures 1 and 2 that allowing for selection e¤ects does
matter for the estimated returns to schooling. From Figure 2 we nd a marginal
returns to schooling which is around one percentage point higher when we allow
for selection e¤ects. When comparing the linear specication with the more ex-
ible specications, we see that there are considerable di¤erences in the estimated
marginal returns across di¤erent levels of schooling. In particular, there are high
returns to completing upper secondary school (12 years) and to take one or two
years of higher education, whereas the marginal return to the last year of schooling,
if the current level of schooling is 15 years or more, is considerably smaller. This is
consistent with the ndings of several empirical studies of returns to schooling using
Norwegian data, cf. e.g. Hægeland, Klette and Salvanes (1999). Thus the strongest
non-linearity in returns to education in Norway appears to arise from a particular
high return to taking some higher education. One may speculate that this partly
reects a positive signal of high productivity to employers.
Figure 3 shows expected log earnings as a function of years of experience, with
all the other variables of the earnings equation xed at their sample means. In
contrast to the estimated returns to schooling, allowing for selection e¤ects only has
minor implications for the estimated returns to experience. We see from Figure 3
that the Box-Cox specication gives higher marginal returns for years of experience
up to four to ve years compared to the other specications.
Concentrating on our preferred specication, with spline transformations of both
schooling and experience and with log earnings as the dependent variable in the
earnings equation, Figure 4 depicts the three di¤erent kinds of marginal returns to
schooling dened in Section 2.3. We see that the average e¤ect of the treatment
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on the treated (TT) in general is higher than the average treatment e¤ect (ATE).
This reects the positive correlation between "2 and 1 that was reported in Table
1: Individuals with higher (idiosyncratic) returns to schooling also invest more in
schooling. Hence the marginal returns at a specic level are higher for those who
actually have completed this level of schooling than for the average individual. In
other words, there is selection by comparative advantage. On the other hand, we
also estimated a negative correlation between "1 and "2; conditional on idiosyncratic
returns to schooling, those with higher earnings potential regardless of schooling 
all else equal tend to choose a lower level of schooling. This is clearly seen from
the earnings-schooling proles in Figure 1. The self-selection related to "2 gives a
atter prole, i.e., individuals with high "2 tend to have low levels of schooling and
vice versa.
To evaluate the t of our preferred specication, Figure 5 plots (i) the discrete
probability density functions over a grid of 100 intervals, with equal width, for the
estimated spline model with log earnings as the dependent variable, and (ii) his-
tograms of the log earnings data. This is done conditional on the chosen level of
schooling, i.e., for eight di¤erent levels. Note that the derived theoretical distribu-
tions are not normal. They are obtained from (8), by integrating out (Z1; Z2) using
the empirical distribution function of these covariates (given the level of schooling).
We see that the estimated model based on the normal distribution is unable to pick
up the heavy tails that characterize the histograms in Figure 5.
3.3 Results for the case with mixture distributions
We conne our analyses here to the case with lnY as the dependent variable and
with spline transformations of both years of schooling and years of experience. The
results in Table 5 refer to the mixture model with Q = 2 and Q = 3, i.e., two and
three mixture distributions, respectively. The new results are comparable to Model
25
3 in Table 1, i.e., the (benchmark) model with normally distributed error terms
and identical "2-distribution across levels of schooling. The benchmark model is a
special case of a mixture model with Q = 1. Detailed results regarding the mixture
parameters are given in Table 6 for the case with Q = 3. By comparing the next-
to-last row in Table 1 and 5, we see a formidable increase in log-likelihood when we
allow normal mixtures. When Q = 3 we obtain a log-likelihood which is 1600 points
higher than the benchmark model with Q = 1 reported in Table 1 (Model 3). The
increase in log-likelihood when going from Q = 2 to Q = 3 is also very large; about
230 points, at the cost of 17 additional parameters.
The estimated coe¢ cients of skewness and kurtosis in Table 5 for the error term
"J2 (R) show clear evidence of non-normality.
4 The coe¢ cient of kurtosis is signif-
icantly above 3 in both models. When Q = 3 we obtain the highest coe¢ cient
of kurtosis (about 6), thus indicating an aggregate earnings distribution (across
schooling levels) with very heavy tails. Also the coe¢ cient of skewness is signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero according to the latter model, and the estimate (0.15
in both models) indicates a modest skewness to the right. Regarding the correla-
tion coe¢ cients Corr("J2 (R); "1) and Corr(1; "1), these have the same sign as in the
benchmark model (Model 3) and they are both signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The most interesting question is perhaps how the estimated returns to schooling
are a¤ected when we allow normal mixtures. The answer is evident from gures
6 and 7. The normal benchmark model (Model 3) and the two mixture models
have estimated average returns to schooling (ATE) that are quite similar. The
only notable di¤erence is that the two latter models exhibit about 2 percentage
points lower ATE when years of schooling is less than or equal to 11 years, and 1-2
percentage points higher for 15-16 years of schooling. We see that the estimated
4The results involving "J2 (R) in Table 5 are obtained by simulations from the estimated distri-
butions of "j(r), J and R.
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returns to schooling is modestly a¤ected by whether we choose Q = 2 or Q = 3.
Concentrating henceforth on the mixture model with with Q = 3, Figure 7
depicts estimates of the three types of treatment e¤ects regarding the returns to
schooling dened in Section 2.3. The graphs are quite similar to the corresponding
graphs in Figure 4, with normally distributed error terms. Again, we see that average
e¤ect of the treatment on the treated (TT) in general is higher than the average
treatment e¤ect (ATE). Note, however, that the di¤erences between the graphs in
Figure 7 are generally smaller than between the corresponding graphs in Figure
4. This is related to the fact that Corr("J2 (R); "1) and Corr(1; "1) when Q = 3
(reported in Table 5) are smaller in magnitude than the corresponding correlations
for Model 3 reported in Table 1.
Figure 8 reproduces Figure 5 in the case where the theoretical model depicted
in Figure 5 is replaced by the normal mixture model with Q = 3. For all levels of
schooling we see that the estimated conditional probability density functions t the
histograms of the log earnings data well. The improvement compared to Figure 5
is particularly striking for schooling levels 7 and 8, where the normal benchmark
model ts the data quite poorly (cf. Figure 5, chart 7 and 8). A QQ- plot for the
marginal distribution of log-earnings is presented in Figure 9. The plot compares the
empirical distribution function (the straight line) with the mixture model (Q = 3)
and the normal benchmark model (Q = 1). The overall impression from these
graphs is that the depicted mixture model ts the data well, and that a substantial
improvement compared to the normal benchmark model is achieved. Similar graphs
for the mixture model with Q = 2 reveal a somewhat poorer t than when Q = 3,
especially for schooling level 7 and 8, but we still get a clear improvement compared
to the benchmark model.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed maximum likelihood estimation of a joint model for
earnings and the choice of level of schooling. The earnings relation is allowed to
be very general with random coe¢ cients and explanatory variables that are exible
transformations of schooling and experience. The choice of level of schooling is
assumed to be an ordered probit model. Under the assumption that the random
terms of the model have a mixed multinormal distribution, we have demonstrated
that the joint distribution of the choice of level of schooling and earnings as well
as explicit formulas for several types of treatment e¤ects regarding the returns to
schooling, can be expressed on closed form.
We have applied this framework and methodology to analyze the structure of
the earnings relation on micro data for Norway. The estimation results show that
if we constrain the transformation of the dependent variable to be of the Box-Cox
type, the logarithm of earnings seems to be the best one in terms of t. Within
the class of Box-Cox transformations, or alternatively spline transformations of the
independent variables years of schooling and potential experience, the latter
family turns out to give the best t. Compared to a multinormal benchmark model,
the mixed multinormal model o¤ers a substantially improved t to the (heavy-tailed)
empirical distribution of the actual log-earnings data.
We believe that the econometric framework developed in this paper o¤ers several
advantages to the researcher compared to the two-stage control function approach.
First, because it is a maximum likelihood approach based on the mixed Gaussian
distribution, it o¤ers considerable exibility. Second, it allows for nonlinear transfor-
mations of the dependent variable that contain unknown parameters. Third, biases
due to heteroscedasticity and imputed estimates from the rst stage that typically
plague the control function approach no longer exist. Fourth, the maximum likeli-
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hood approach facilitates testing of alternative model specications.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
Dene Y [] = (Y    1)=. Inserting (5) into (3) we obtain
Y [] = T (X;) + Z22 + (T (X;)+ )"1 + T (X;)e + e"2:
Since J is independent of e"2 and e, we have:
Var(T (X;)e + e"2jJ = j; Z) = Var(T (Xj;)e + e"2jZ)
= g(T (Xj;))2,
using the denition of g() in (6). Given ("1, J; Z) we therefore obtain
P (Y [] 2 (z; z+dz)j"1; J = j; Z) = dz
g(T (Xj;))


z   T (Xj;)   Z22   (T (Xj;)+ )"1
g(T (Xj;))

.
(23)
Let Kj = (j 1   Z11; j   Z11]. Since J = j , "1 2 Kj, we obtain from (23)
that
P (Y [] 2 (z; z + dz); J = jjZ)
=
Z
P (Y [] 2 (z; z + dz)j"1; J = j; Z)P (J = jjZ1; "1)("1) d"1
=
Z
P (Y [] 2 (z; z + dz)j"1; J = j; Z)1("1 2 Kj)("1) d"1
=
Z j Z11
j 1 Z11
dz
g(T (Xj;))


z   T (Xj;)   Z22   (T (Xj;)+ )"1
g(T (Xj;))

("1) d"1;
(24)
where 1(B) is the indicator function which is one if the event B is true and zero
else. Since
1

(
a  b"1

)("1) =
1
(2 + b2)1=2
(
a
(2 + b2)1=2
) d
d"1

 
"1   ab
(2 + b2)

(2 + b2)
1
2

!
,
(25)
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we obtain from (24), using (25) with a = z   T (Xj;)   Z22, b = T (Xj;)+ 
and  = g(T (Xj;)), that
P (Y [] 2 (z; z + dz); J = jjZ) = dz
 (T (Xj;))


z   T (Xj;)   Z22
 (T (Xj;))




j   Z11  
(y   T (Xj;)   Z22) (T (Xj;)+ )
 (T (Xj;))2

 (T (Xj;))
g(T (Xj;))

 

j 1   Z11  
(y   T (Xj;)   Z22) (T (Xj;)+ )
 (T (Xj;))2

 (T (Xj;))
g(T (Xj;))

.
(26)
Now, letting z = (y 1)=, we get dz = y 1dy by the change-of-variables formula.
Hence the density in terms of untransformed earnings, y, becomes equal to (8). This
completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Similarly to (5), we can write
"2(r) = "1(r) + e"2(r), (r) = "1(r) + e(r); (27)
where (e"2(r);e(r)0) has covariance matrix  and is independent of "1(r). Using (9)
and (27), we then obtain
"j2(r) = jr"1(r) + jr + e"j2(r), (28)
wheree"j2(r) = jre"2(r) is independent of "1(r) and the covariance matrix of (e"j2(r);e(r)0)
is jr(r) dened in (14). We realize that when R = r and J = j, the proof of
Corollary 2 is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, with ("1; "2; 0) and
(e"2;e0) now being replaced by ("1(r); "j2(r); (r)0) and (e"j2(r);e(r)0), respectively. The
modications in (12) compared to (8) occur because the mean of "j2(r) is jr,  in
(6) is replaced by jr(r) (yielding (13)); and  in (7) is replaced by jr (yielding
(15)).
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Proof of Corollary 3.
Recall that J = j , "1 2 Kj. Using the rule of double expectation and (27), we
obtain
E((R)jJ = j) =
QX
r=1
qrE((r)j"1(r) 2 Kj; R = r) =
QX
r=1
qrE("1(r) + e(r)j"1(r) 2 Kj; R = r)
= E("1(r)j"1(r) 2 Kj) = E ("1(r)1f"1(r) 2 Kjg)
P (J = j)
= 
R j Z11
j 1 Z11 u(u) du
P (J = j)
=   (j   Z11)  (j 1   Z11)
(j   Z11)  (j 1   Z11)
=  (j); (29)
where, in the third equation, we have used that e(r) is independent of "1(r) and
R is independent of ("1(r); e(r)0) for every r. This proves (18). Consider next the
proof of (19). Similarly to (29), we obtain
E("2(R)jJ = j; R = r) = E("1(r) + e"2(r)j"1(r) 2 Kj; R = r) = E("1(r)j"1(r) 2 Kj)
= 
E ("1(r)1f"1(r) 2 Kjg)
P (J = j)
=  (j), (30)
where we used that e"1(r) is independent of "1(r) and R is independent of ("1(r);
e"2(r)). From (9) and the rule of double expectation, we obtain
E("k2(R)jJ = j) = E (kR"2(R) + kRjJ = j)
=
QX
r=1
qrE (kR"2(R) + kRjJ = j; R = r)
=
QX
r=1
qr (krE("2(R)jJ = j; R = r) + kr)
=  
 
QX
r=1
qrkr
!
(j);
where, in the last equality, we used (30) and the summation restriction (16). This
completes the proof of (19).
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Figures and tables
Table 1: Parameter estimates of earnings equation for di¤erent model
specications. Standard errors in parentheses
Model specication
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Earnings: ln y ln y ln y (Y    1) =
Schooling: Linear Box-Cox Splines Splines
Experience: Quadratic Box-Cox Splines Splines
 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) -.17 (.003)
1 .08 (.003) .66 (.09) .06 (.005) .01 (.001)
2 -.0005 (.0001) .21 (.01) .01 (.001) .05 (.005)
SD("2) .26 (.01) .51 (.10) .24 (.03) .05 (.001)
SD(1) .01 (.004) .08 (.02) .01 (.001) .001 (.0002)
SD(2) .0003 (.00004) .13 (.02) .01 (.001) .03 (.004)
Corr("2; "1) -.12 (.05) -.34 (.06) -.25 (.05) -.25 (.04)
Corr(1; "1) .03 (.24) .39 (.06) .35 (07) .47 (.16)
Corr(1; "2) .92 (.13) -.82 (.06) -.13 (.23) .30 (.16)
Corr(2; "1) -.04 (.07) -.01 (.03) -.03 (.03) .06 (.05)
Corr(2; "2) -.62 (.07) -.93 (.02) -.48 (.11) -.15 (.08)
Corr(2; 1) -.87 (.17) .77 (.06) .64 (.11) -.77 (.15)
1;1 11.26 (1.39)
1;2 1 (-) .28 (.03)
2;1 -29.5 (2.48) 2.49 (.62)
2;2 2 (-) .002 (.002)
log-likelihood -27274 -27251 -27179 -27058
Sample size 29,332 29,332 29,332 29,332
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for schooling, experience and earnings
Variable Mean St.dev. Min Max
Years of schooling 12.2 2.3 7 18.0
Years of experience 15.2 5.9 0 29.0
Log of earnings 7.7 0.3 6.4 9.8
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Figure 1: Expected log earnings as a function of years of schooling
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Figure 2: Expected marginal returns to schooling (ATE)
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Figure 3: Expected log earnings as a function of experience
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Figure 4: Estimates of marginal treatment e¤ects. Models with normally
distributed error terms
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Figure 5: Normally distributed error terms: The conditional distributions
of log earnings given the level of schooling. Estimated probability distribution
functions and histograms of log earning data
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Figure 6: Comparing estimates of the average treatment e¤ect (ATE):
Model with normally distributed error terms and two mixture models.
Spline transformation of years of schooling
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Figure 7: Estimates of di¤erent treatment e¤ects: Model with mixed
multinormally distributed error terms (Q=3)
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Figure 8: Mixed multinormally distributed error terms (Q=3): The condi-
tional distributions of log earnings given the level of schooling. Estimated
probability distribution functions and histograms of log earning data
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Figure 9: Comparing estimated and empirical distribution functions: QQ-
plot for the marginal distribution of log earnings
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for Z1 with corresponding parameter esti-
mates
Z1-variables Mean St.dev Min Max Parameter S.E.
estimate
Lone mother 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.27 0.07
Lone father 0.01 0.08 0 1 -0.05 0.08
No parents 0.01 0.09 0 1 -0.13 0.07
Mother working 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.02 0.01
Father working 0.93 0.25 0 1 0.07 0.04
Family income:
quintile 2 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.09 0.02
quintile 3 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.15 0.02
quintile 4 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.23 0.02
quintile 5 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.32 0.03
Mothers schooling:
lower secondary 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.35 0.02
upper secondary 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.45 0.03
lower tertiary 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.71 0.04
upper teritary 0.00 0.06 0 1 0.88 0.13
Fathers schooling:
lower secondary 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.31 0.02
upper secondary 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.39 0.02
lower tertiary 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.69 0.03
upper teritary 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.99 0.04
Born abroad 0.00 0.02 0 1 -0.31 0.27
Father born abroad 0.06 0.24 0 1 -0.08 0.05
Mother born abroad 0.03 0.16 0 1 -0.08 0.04
Østfold 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.03 0.03
Akershus 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.04 0.03
Hedmark 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.07 0.04
Oppland 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.14 0.04
Buskerud 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 0.03
Vestfold 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.09 0.04
Telemark 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.14 0.04
A-Agder 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.24 0.05
V-Agder 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.22 0.04
Rogaland 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.11 0.03
Hordaland 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.20 0.03
Sogn Fj. 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.36 0.04
Møre Roms. 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.26 0.03
S-Tr. 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.21 0.03
N-Tr. 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.42 0.04
Nordland 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.34 0.03
Troms 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.24 0.04
Finnmark 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.27 0.05
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Z2 with corresponding parameter esti-
mates
Z2-variables Mean St.dev. Min Max Parameter S.E.
estimate
Intercept 7.33 0.04
Manufacturing 0 -
Public services 0.28 0.45 0 1 -0.20 0.03
Private services 0.40 0.49 0 1 -0.04 0.03
Unspecied 0.00 0.04 0 1 -0.23 0.04
General 0.19 0.40 0 1 0.05 0.03
Humanities 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.10 0.04
Teaching 0.06 0.23 0 1 -0.14 0.05
Technical 0 -
Business/administrative 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.02 0.02
Transport 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.03 0.01
Health 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.07 0.00
Farming/sheries 0.02 0.13 0 1 -0.06 0.05
Services/military 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.08 0.01
Østfold 0.05 0.21 0 1 -0.15 0.01
Akershus 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.03 0.01
Oslo 0 -
Hedmark 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.19 0.00
Oppland 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.22 0.01
Buskerud 0.05 0.21 0 1 -0.11 0.01
Vestfold 0.04 0.19 0 1 -0.14 0.01
Telemark 0.03 0.17 0 1 -0.13 0.01
A-Agder 0.02 0.13 0 1 -0.18 0.01
V-Agder 0.03 0.17 0 1 -0.14 0.01
Rogaland 0.08 0.27 0 1 -0.02 0.01
Hordaland 0.09 0.29 0 1 -0.11 0.01
Sogn Fj. 0.02 0.15 0 1 -0.18 0.01
Møre Roms. 0.05 0.22 0 1 -0.16 0.01
S-Tr. 0.06 0.23 0 1 -0.18 0.01
N-Tr. 0.02 0.15 0 1 -0.23 0.01
Nordland 0.05 0.21 0 1 -0.20 0.01
Tromsø 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.16 0.01
Finnmark 0.02 0.12 0 1 -0.21 0.01
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Table 5: Parameter estimates of earnings equation for two normal mixture
models: Q=2 and Q=3. Standard errors in parentheses
Mixture distribution:
Q = 2 Q = 3
Earnings: ln y ln y
Schooling: Splines Splines
Experience: Splines Splines
1 0:003 (:00006) 0:002 (:00005)
2 1:61 (:21) 0:58 (:06)
SD ("J2 (R)) 0:31 (:029) 0:28 (:01)
Coe¤. of skewness "J2 (R) 0:15 (:08) 0:15 (:07)
Coe¤. of kurtosis "J2 (R) 4:99 (:86) 6:02 (:74)
SD(1) 0:0005 (:00005) 0:0003 (:00005)
SD(2) 0:63 (:05) 0:19 (:01)
Corr("J2 (R); "1)  0:08 (:03)  0:10 (:04)
Corr(1; "1) 0:41 (:13) 0:22 (:07)
Corr(1; "
J
2 (R)) 0:84 (:08) 0:82 (:10)
Corr(2; "1)  010 (:03)  0:11 (:03)
Corr(2; "
J
2 (R))  0:92 (:03)  0:80 (:01)
Corr(2; 1) 0:86 (:07)  0:45 (:15)
log-likelihood  25810  25579
Sample size 29; 332 29; 332
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Table 6: Estimates of mixture parameters when Q=3. Standard errors in
parentheses
Parameter Mixture distribution (r):
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3
qr 0:80 0:19 (:013) 0:01 (:001)
1r 1:24 0:00 ( ) 0:15 (:17)
2r 1:24 0:00 ( ) 0:00 ( )
3r 1:20 0:00 ( ) 2:39 (:35)
4r 0:71 2:13 (:09) 2:50 (:25)
5r 0:13 2:95 (:20) 24:9 (4:82)
6r 0:80 1:74 (:18) 2:32 (:48)
7r 1:22 0:00 ( ) 1:44 (:45)
8r 0:75 1:92 (:12) 2:97 (:61)
1r 0.05 0.27 (:03) -0.73 (:05)
2r 0.04 0:26 (:02) -0.88 (:05)
3r 0.05 0.27 (:03) -0.77 (:08)
4r 0.05 0.26 (:03) -0.74 (:07)
5r -0.08 0.21 (:05) -7.75 (1.05)
6r 0.05 0.28 (:03) -0.90 (.12)
7r -0.01 -0.11 (:04) 0.91 (:08)
8r 0.06 0.30 (:03) -0.69 (:17)
* All estimates for r = 1 determined by summation
restrictions, cf. (16) and (17)
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